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FUTURE TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS IN WAR
James Jay Carafano*
The influence of technology on war is overrated. Technology does not win
wars. It does not lose wars. It does not even fight wars. People do. New technology
is the handmaiden of change, but even technologies that take the human “out of the
loop” have a hand behind the handmaiden. New technologies pose far fewer new
ethical challenges to warfare than is often supposed. The current wave of
technological innovation, which is largely derivative of innovations in data
processing and transmission, will not change the traditional relationship between
technology and ethics in war very much.
On the other hand, there are enormous challenges to the traditional ethical
framework that has been used to judge the use of violence in armed conflict. This
tug-of-war is at the root of the contemporary debate over the changing role of
weapons in war.
I. JUST WAR AND CURRENT WAR
Foundational to this assessment is the belief that ethics are rooted in culture.
In the West, the predominant ethical framework for assessing what is right and
wrong is the just war doctrine (also described as just war theory or the just war
tradition). 1 This doctrine, deriving from classical and Christian philosophy, is at
the root of the Western conception of what constitutes the legitimate use of force
by the state. 2
In applying the ethics of war to technology, the most relevant principle of just
war doctrine is the standard of proportionality. “Just war theory, the most widely
accepted theory of the morality of war,” Professor Thomas Hurka rightly points
out, “contains two proportionality conditions that say a war or an act in war is
justified only if the damage it causes is not excessive.” 3 One set of conditions are
the jus ad bellum. 4 Before force is used, it must be for a reasonable purpose,
employed by a competent authority, and have a reasonable chance of success.5 In
addition, the destructive evil caused by war must not be disproportionate to the
relevant good a just war might accomplish. 6 The other set of conditions are the jus
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in bello. 7 Intentionally targeting noncombatants is forbidden, and combatants must
make efforts to limit the danger to noncombatants. 8 The use of force must be for a
military purpose—in other words not indiscriminate—and the risk to harming
innocents cannot be out of proportion to the direct military end that is anticipated. 9
For example, leveling an entire city to take out a sniper would be considered a
violation of the proportionality principle. Indeed, such prohibitions are codified in
formal rules, such as the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention. 10
Introducing new technologies does not change anything in using the ethical
framework of the just war doctrine. As the technology changes and evolves, what
is proportional is largely a military-technical question, not an ethical one. As
technology gets more destructive, or its application more precise, what could be
considered legitimately proportional might change—but that is a question of
prudent judgment, not morality.
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTANT
It is a mistake to believe the ethical application of technology in war can be
determined in absence of a practical understanding of how the technology is
applied. A case in point was the development of strategic bombing during World
War II, which saw a significant increase in the destructive power of aerial
bombing—way out of proportion to the capacity of militaries to more precisely
direct that power to limit the danger to innocents. Disconnecting that reality from
ethical judgment skews the results. Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: A
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, however, makes exactly that
mistake. 11 Rather than derive theory from history, as his subtitle suggests, Walzer
uses historical examples to illustrate a theory of ethical decision making—and he
gets it exactly wrong. 12 He has little confidence in the study of facts. Instead, the
practice of warfare is considered subjective and vague—primarily a tool for
illustrating the complexities of choice rather than a guide for action.
To illustrate the moral challenges of command responsibility, Walzer draws
on General Omar Bradley’s decision to carpet bomb the area west of St. Lo during
the Allied breakout from Normandy in July 1944. 13 During the bombing, Allied
7
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planes killed and wounded an unknown number of French civilians, as well as
hundreds of American soldiers. 14 Walzer suggests that if Bradley had not taken
“due care” to make the minimum reasonable effort to minimize civilian casualties
or consider reasonable alternatives, his decision to bomb civilians was morally
indefensible. 15 But then Walzer admits he lacks the technical expertise and
research to fairly judge the General’s choice and simply concludes, “There is no
sure rule against which to measure the conduct of General Bradley.” 16 Walzer
misses an opportunity to make an important point: in modern warfare, technical
knowledge and expertise are central to the issue of determining command
responsibility.
The reality was that as brutal as carpet bombing might have appeared from
Walzer’s perspective—an academic writing in the late 1970s—he did not know
what he was talking about. In his book, Walzer offers several alternative courses of
action that Bradley might have used to avoid the carpet bombing. 17 In reality, a
careful study shows that none were really practical alternatives and that Bradley’s
tactical scheme was not only appropriate, but the best option available.18 In short,
Walzer turns a technical judgment into a moral question because he does not know
what he is talking about.
Technology in war has come a very long way since World War II. As Charles
Williams Maynes pointed out over two decades ago, since World War II we have
not become more moral, but we have become more accurate.19 The spot that
required nine thousand bombs to hit accurately in World War II required two
hundred in Vietnam and one in the Gulf War. 20 Today, the US military can take out
a target with a single bomb or missile. 21 Yet technical issues such as accuracy and
lethality are as essential to the calculus of determining moral responsibility today
as they were then. For a discussion of ethical conduct to contribute to
understanding, the considerations of theory and practice must go hand in hand.
Practice is not simply a tool for illuminating theory.
Often discussions of the ethics of modern war—such as the use of armed
drones—are not about ethics at all, but are rather a technical-military assessment of
the appropriate use of force.
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Granted, these debates can be maddening. Critics complain that covert
operations are, well, covert, and the facts to judge the judgments are not readily
available. 22 Even where there are not concerns for operational security, the basic
facts and information needed to evaluate military decisionmaking may not be
readily available—lost in the fog of war. Some groups create their own facts.
Efforts to estimate civilian deaths due to the Iraq War offer a case in point.23 Lack
of basic effort may make evaluations of military decisions difficult for outsiders,
but that is not a new problem, and it does not create a new ethical dilemma.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF NEW ETHICS
How we think about technology in war may indeed be changing, but not
necessarily because the technology is changing. Our thinking may be changing
because our ethics are changing. One particularly important trend to note is the rise
of the importance of empathy in Western culture. 24 We may be entering an age
where feeling may increasingly trump reason when judging the use of violence.
The Western thinking and the ethics at the foundation of that way of thinking
are rooted in two competing intellectual cultures. On the one hand, the Western
approach to war derives from a tradition of applying rational decisions to public
decisions. 25 On the other hand, we are also products of an older narrative culture,
dominated by the oral transmission of ideas in the form of stories that have a
beginning and an end, heroes and villains, and lessons to be learned. 26
The information age has empowered both our rational and narrative cultures.
Information technology gives us more data, but it also allows opinion-makers to
spin better, more compelling stories faster and to proliferate them more widely. 27
In many areas of modern life the analytical power of the information age
dominates, but not in the public sphere where public policies are disputed,
including our judgments over what is just in war. 28 While computers expand
computational power, they also power e-mail, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and
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other social networking tools (often collectively called Web 2.0),29 which facilitate
conversation and storytelling on a global scale.30
Narrative culture’s emerging dominance may also be attributable in part to the
increasing importance of empathy in the contemporary world. Empathy has risen
to become a key preferred attribute of Western society. 31 The emotion of caring
overwhelms the logic of cold hard facts. Because stories are particularly effective
at stirring our empathic impulses, the power of information technology pushes that
impulse into overdrive. 32 Historian Lynn Hunt argues, for example, that
contemporary concerns over torture and the universal nature of human rights are
modern expressions of an increasingly empathic culture. 33
Another possible candidate for explaining the rising power of the narrative
over analysis is the profound transformation in our understandings of the
representation of truth and facts that has been driven by postmodern philosophy
and literary criticism. “These have led scholars to value ‘smart’ and ‘interesting’
work over the ‘sound’ and ‘rigorous’ studies that were most praised in earlier
decades,” suggests sociologist Michéle Lamont. 34 Perhaps these academic attitudes
have crossed over to influence the character of the debate in public decisionmaking
as well. The emphasis on empathy and feeling over rational judgment makes
ethical judgments such as proportionality seem quaint, old fashioned, and out of
touch with modern sentiments.
A second challenge to the just war tradition is the increasing use of “lawfare”
in international politics.35 This tactic comprises efforts to thwart U.S. policies by
attempting to undermine America’s legitimate efforts to exercise sovereignty and
act in its own interests as it sees fit. 36 Some analysts define this lawfare as
misusing or reinterpreting laws to make American actions appear illegitimate in
the eyes of the world. 37
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One particularly egregious exercise of lawfare has been conducted by
international human rights activists, including certain “special rapporteurs”
operating out of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. 38 Attacks
with U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly referred to as drones) have been
one particular target for these groups. 39 Indeed, U.N. special rapporteur Ben
Emmerson of the United Kingdom recently announced a new investigation into the
U.S.’s use of drones in various countries. 40
The problem with lawfare is that it blurs the line between the law and political
advocacy. What is rational or legitimate becomes less important than what we
want. Such a basis of public decisionmaking is far different from the rules of war
derived from the just war tradition.
A third challenge to the just war framework is the increasing argument in
international affairs that sovereignty just does not count anymore. Just war
traditions are grounded in the belief that the State is the ultimate arbiter of the use
of force in the name of the State. 41 That idea is increasingly coming under
question. Human security, for example, is a concept that is being increasingly
trumpeted as a collection of rights that trump the sovereign authority of the State
when it comes to the legitimate use of force.
Over the years, various groups have stretched the definition of “security” to
mean supranational entities intervening ostensibly to protect individuals anywhere
and the definition of “rights” to include everything from a right to life to a right to
development and resources. 42 For example, the United Nations is pursuing a broad
reports/2006/08/international-law-and-the-nation-state-at-the-un-a-guide-for-us-policymak
ers.
38
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2009).
42
James Jay Carafano & Janice A. Smith, The Muddled Notion of ‘Human Security’
at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found.,
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1, 2006, at 1–2, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2006/09/the-muddled-notion-of-human-security-at-the-un-a-guide-for-us-policyma
kers.

2013]

FUTURE TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS IN WAR

1269

human security agenda that aims to shift the focus of U.N. and other international
activities away from state relations to protecting groups of people based on a
plethora of needs and wants. 43 If the responsibility for determining the legitimate
use of force shifts from States to international organizations, then the rules may
change as well.
A fourth challenge to the just war approach is that wars are increasingly
occurring among cultures that do not share the same ethical framework. As James
Bowman points out, the concept of “honor” is interpreted differently in different
parts of the world. 44 In the West, the notion of honor became equivalent to virtue.
Other cultures equate honor with power. So what is honorable in war may be very
different to warriors reared in different traditions.
IV. BRAVE NEW WORLD
The modern debate about the ethics of technology in war is not about changes
in technology. It is about tensions that are pulling the ethical frameworks we use to
evaluate what is just in war in different directions. For example, social science
research shows that when intelligence analysts look at the same data using
different conceptual structures, they often reach different conclusions on how to
interpret the “facts.” 45 That same dynamic is affecting the increasingly contentious
debate on how to view the legitimate use of technology in modern war.
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